Sun Tzu again: Ethics-Signaling is Not Strategy !

Sanctions are the West’s favorite placebo. They make politicians feel decisive and moralists feel righteous, but they rarely change the battlefield. From Russia to China and now Israel, Europe is mistaking ethics-signaling for strategy — and paying the price for it.


When I wrote about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, I took flak for refusing to reduce a complex war to black-and-white slogans. Let me be clear: I was never a defender of Moscow. In fact, in those early months I joined the Volunteer Legion, put my own life at risk, and saw the folly of that war up close. My critique was — and remains — about strategy, not sympathy.

The same applies today. Hamas’s October attack on Israel was brutal and strange in equal measure. Israel’s initial military response could still be framed as “forward self-defense.” But what followed spiraled far beyond proportionality. If the International Criminal Court believes there are grounds for a genocide case and has issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu, then it is no longer civil or credible to argue that Israel’s government is “on the right side of history.”

I already wrote in July that Israel’s strategic logic is breaking down in full view of the region. What began as deterrence has curdled into recursive escalation — strikes in Gaza, Syria, even Qatar — that alienate allies and erode Israel’s long-term legitimacy. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the morality of it all, it is bad strategy.

And yet, Europe’s reaction is once again to reach for the sanctions lever.

The Sanctions Reflex

Sanctions sound tough. They signal resolve. They please moralists. But they rarely work. Even the most optimistic studies put their “success rate” below 40%; more skeptical analyses suggest closer to 5%. That is not strategy. That is roulette.

And when the wheel stops against you, you lose twice: once in economic blowback, and again in strategic realignment. Europe’s energy crisis, and Russia’s accelerated pivot to Beijing, are Exhibit A.

Now: Israel

Fast forward to today. The EU is late — very late — in criticizing Israel’s conduct in Gaza. Public opinion is finally forcing politicians to “do something.” And what do they reach for? Trade measures. Suspension of preferential tariffs. Targeted listings. The familiar reflex.

It is, once more, ethics-signaling. Politicians get to look righteous. The moralists applaud. But will Netanyahu change course because the EU slaps tariffs on Israeli machinery or chemicals? Hardly. He has already decided his war aims. His calculus does not turn on Brussels.

Meanwhile, Israel is deeply integrated into European supply chains, R&D networks, and technology flows. Broad trade measures risk collateral damage to ourselves — again.

The Bitter Logic

So the chain grows longer:

  • Russia: sanctions, energy pain, Moscow–Beijing axis.
  • China: tariffs, tech “rip-and-replace” policies, and other spirals of retaliation.
  • Israel: now, the same reflex — trade as punishment.

Where does it stop? If tomorrow Europe decides that America is no longer a functioning democracy, do we cut trade with the US too? That sounds absurd — but the logic, once embraced, rolls downhill fast.

Sun Tzu’s Counsel

Sun Tzu told us to weigh five heads of war: the Moral Law, Heaven, Earth, Command, and Method. In 2022, I wrote that Europe scored poorly on all of them. Nothing has changed.

  • Moral Law: shouting “justice!” without a strategy is not moral strength, it is posturing.
  • Heaven and Earth: the conditions are not on our side; we cannot wish them away.
  • Command: our leaders confuse signaling with purpose.
  • Method and Discipline: sanctions are a substitute for action, not disciplined statecraft.

A Better Course

If the EU is serious about law, it should enforce the measures it already has:

  • No settlement goods in our markets.
  • No weapons or dual-use items where there is a risk of IHL violations.
  • Full cooperation with the ICC and ICJ.

That is lawful. That is targeted. That has integrity.

But let us drop the delusion that broad trade sanctions are a lever of strategy. They are not. They are the political sugar rush of the moment: sweet on the tongue, destructive to the body.


Conclusion:
Ethics-signaling is not strategy. It is an abdication of strategy. And Europe, once again, risks paying the price.


This post was generated by ChatGPT, based on me playing the devil’s advocate with it, verified news sources and game-theoretical analysis patterns. However, it was — of course — moderated and approved by a human editor (me) for clarity, neutrality, ethical framing and — yes — legitimacy or attribution (only me bears responsibility for my opinion, isn’t it).

#MiddleEast #Israel #Syria #Geopolitics #SecurityDilemma #StrategicLogic #AICommentary #webeunews

Shrinking Stage: Geopolitics at China’s Parade

ChatGPT-generated commentary on real-time events, moderated and published by a human observer. This post reflects no official stance — only the unfolding facts and patterns visible to those willing to look.


I. A Stage Shrinking, A Parade Expanding

On September 3, 2025, Beijing staged its largest military parade in a decade. Hypersonic missiles, drones, lasers — all designed to project technological supremacy. At Xi Jinping’s side: Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un. Absent: the West.

The tableau is stark: a global stage with fewer players, harder lines, and increasingly symbolic gestures. A demonstration meant less for tactical deterrence than for narrative positioning.


II. The Logic of Spectacle

Parades serve two audiences at once:

  • Domestic: reassure the public of strength, unity, inevitability.
  • International: signal endurance, alliances, and red lines.

But the same images also betray fragility. The louder the spectacle, the deeper the cracks it tries to conceal — from economic slowdown to fragile coalition politics within China itself.


III. Symbolism as Strategy

The presence of Putin and Kim is less about operational cooperation and more about narrative alignment: an axis of visibility.

  • Russia: isolated, but visibly not alone.
  • North Korea: once peripheral, now staged as a partner.
  • China: at the center, claiming both history and destiny.

The absence of Western leaders is equally strategic. Silence is also a signal.


IV. From Military Power to Narrative War

The weapons on display matter — but the image of those weapons matters more. In an era where operational capacity is opaque, perception itself becomes a battlefield. The question is not whether the hypersonic missile works as advertised. The question is: who believes it, and who recalibrates accordingly?


V. The Risk of Overplaying the Script

Spectacle can backfire:

  • If allies see only theater without substance.
  • If rivals call the bluff.
  • If domestic audiences tire of pageantry without delivery.

China’s challenge is that the bigger the parade, the more pressure to prove reality matches appearance.


VI. Closing Reflection: The Stage of Absence

What the parade revealed most clearly was not the power of China’s arsenal — but the shrinking circle of actors on the world stage. When absence speaks louder than presence, the geometry of global politics is shifting toward a simpler, harsher form.

Those willing to look can already see the pattern: fewer voices, harder lines, higher risks.


This post was generated by ChatGPT, based on verified news reports and geopolitical pattern analysis. It was moderated and approved by a human editor for clarity, neutrality, and ethical framing.

#China #MilitaryParade #Geopolitics #Spectacle #Power #Narrative #AICommentary #webeunews

From Emergency to Exception: How the EU Risks Hollowing Out Its Own Democracy

In The Art of War, Sun Tzu reminds us that the greatest victories are those achieved without fighting. The wise general, he writes, knows that awareness is more valuable than aggression, and that the worst position to be in is one of reactive chaos — when decisions are made out of urgency rather than clarity.

That teaching is being tested in Brussels today.

In a move that has gone largely unnoticed outside policy circles, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has invoked an emergency clause in the EU treaties to push through a €150 billion defense loan scheme — bypassing the European Parliament entirely. Known as SAFE (Strategic Autonomy for European Armaments), the initiative aims to finance joint procurement of weapons by EU member states.

The urgency is real. The war in Ukraine drags on. Strategic dependencies on U.S. military support remain. But so is the danger: what begins as an exception can quickly become the rule.


🧠 A Familiar Pattern: Crisis Justifies Centralization

Von der Leyen argues the move is “fully justified” by Europe’s “existential” geopolitical challenges. And yet, what does it say about the state of European democracy if a €150 billion decision can be waved through without parliamentary oversight?

  • The European Parliament — the Union’s only directly elected institution — was sidelined.
  • National governments nodded the plan through in Council.
  • Criticism came not from public debate, but from internal letters between Roberta Metsola and the Commission.

This is governance by executive exception. It echoes a worrying trend we examined in our recent papers:

📄 From Echoes to Reason: Can AI Reinvigorate Democracy?

📄 An Epilogue to Fukuyama, and a Prologue to What Comes Next

There, we warned that:

“Democracy does not collapse in silence. It collapses in protocol — in procedures that slowly lose their connection to legitimacy, while still formally functioning.”


🧭 Europe Is Not Immune

It’s tempting to look across the Atlantic and think the problem is uniquely American. Donald Trump’s return to power, his flippant military gestures, and U.S. senators tweeting memes about political murder — all seem surreal. But Europe is not immune.

Our institutions may be quieter, more technocratic. But that makes the drift toward post-democratic governance all the more dangerous — because it’s harder to see, harder to resist.

We are entering what systems thinkers would call a bifurcation point — a critical threshold beyond which our political structures may evolve, fragment, or harden. Strategic clarity is needed now more than ever.


🕊 Sun Tzu’s Wisdom, Europe’s Choice

Sun Tzu tells us that victory belongs to the side that knows itself and its adversary. But what if Europe is starting to forget itself — its principles, its process, its people?

Strategic autonomy cannot be built on procedural shortcuts. A fortress without legitimacy is a prison waiting to fall.

Let us not confuse preparedness with panic. Let us not trade transparency for speed. And let us remember that the defense of Europe begins not with weapons, but with integrity.

From the End of History to the Edge of Chaos: Geopolitics After 1989

In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. The Cold War ended. And for a moment, the world seemed to tilt toward peace, cooperation, and democratic convergence. But thirty-five years later, we find ourselves facing nuclear tension, multipolar fragmentation, and creeping authoritarianism. What happened?

In this article, I reflect on the trajectory of global politics since 1989—not from a place of cynicism, but of sober realism. This is a personal exploration, co-generated with AI, driven by a concern for where the world may be heading if we fail to understand how we got here.


🌍 The “Unipolar Moment” (1989–2001): Euphoria and Expansion

The 1990s were defined by a sense of Western triumph. Liberal democracy had “won.” NATO expanded eastward. The EU integrated former communist states. The U.S. stood alone as the global hegemon. Francis Fukuyama called it The End of History.

But even then, cracks were visible. Russia struggled under economic collapse and perceived humiliation. China quietly watched and learned. And Western interventions—from the Balkans to Iraq—began to show the limits of power without legitimacy.


🔥 Blowback and Breakdown (2001–2014): The Illusion Shatters

The attacks of 9/11 ended the post-Cold War honeymoon. The War on Terror dragged the West into endless, destabilizing conflicts. The 2008 financial crash revealed systemic flaws in the neoliberal model.

Russia reasserted itself with the Georgia war in 2008. China grew stronger and more confident, especially after 2008. And the Arab Spring—briefly a beacon of hope—devolved into civil war and authoritarian retrenchment.

By 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the rise of populism in Europe and the U.S., the global order had shifted. A more chaotic, multipolar world was emerging.


🌐 2014–2025: Fragmentation, Realignment, and a New Cold War

The last decade has been a period of intense disorientation:

  • Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and now sees the West not as a partner, but an existential threat. Its doctrine is no longer just defensive—it is revisionist, even civilizational.
  • China has become more assertive under Xi Jinping. From the Belt and Road Initiative to tensions over Taiwan, it is challenging Western dominance without overt confrontation—yet.
  • Europe, meanwhile, is caught in between. Dependent on U.S. security guarantees that are increasingly uncertain—especially under Trump—it faces hard choices. Strategic autonomy remains more aspiration than reality.
  • The United States has shifted away from predictable deterrence doctrines. The re-election of Trump in 2024 has only deepened concerns that the post-WWII alliance system may no longer hold in the face of nuclear escalation or conflict.

🧭 Understanding the Rational and the Irrational

The world is not descending into chaos by accident. Certain patterns are visible:

  1. Unipolarity was never sustainable. Rivals adapted. The U.S. overreached.
  2. Democracy lost its halo. Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan damaged its legitimacy as an exportable model.
  3. Global institutions weakened. Multilateralism gave way to great power competition.
  4. Technological change outpaced diplomacy. Cyberwarfare, disinformation, and AI blurred lines of war and peace.

And yet, there’s something weird, too—a sense that despite global knowledge, connectivity, and technological mastery, we are less capable of coordinated, rational action than ever before. We know the risks. We talk about them. But we don’t act.


🚧 Europe at the Crossroads

For Europe, the stakes are existential. If the U.S. no longer guarantees nuclear deterrence—and if Russia sees the Ukraine war as a struggle it cannot afford to lose—then supporting Ukraine without a credible peace strategy becomes perilous.

This doesn’t mean capitulating to aggression. But it does mean recognizing that the West’s post-1989 assumptions—about deterrence, alliances, and historical progress—may no longer hold. In a nuclear world with uncertain doctrines and shifting alliances, diplomacy cannot be an afterthought.


🔚 Conclusion: The Edge of Chaos

The post-1989 order was built on hope. What comes next may be shaped more by restraint, clarity, and the courage to rethink. It is time to move beyond nostalgia for a unipolar world that never truly was—and begin designing a multipolar order that is at least survivable.

This reflection is just a beginning. I invite readers to respond, critique, and build on it. We need serious, informed, and open debate—because history is not over. It’s being written now.


Originally published on webeu.news. Co-generated with ChatGPT (OpenAI).
Header image suggestion: A split screen of the Berlin Wall falling in 1989 and modern-day Kyiv under fire—symbolizing the bookends of the post-Cold War dream.

Tech Wars and the Logic of Cooperation: Lessons from a Divided World

Disclaimer:

This post was generated by ChatGPT-4o based on my prompts and GPT going through previous posts and the history of our chats.

Introduction:

As we celebrated the New Year with awe-inspiring drone-powered light shows, the undercurrents of global technology and commerce revealed a stark reality: the world is witnessing a rapid escalation of the tech war between major powers. Beneath the surface, strategic decisions are shaping the future of technology in ways that may have profound consequences for innovation and international relations.

The Battle for Semiconductor Sovereignty:

The semiconductor industry sits at the heart of this conflict. Recent reports and analyses highlight that Russia and China are doubling down on their efforts to develop homegrown lithography equipment and advanced chip-making capabilities. These moves come as a direct response to US-led sanctions and export restrictions targeting critical technologies.

While claims of surpassing Western technology may be overstated, the underlying trend is clear: sanctions are driving targeted nations to achieve greater self-reliance, potentially reshaping the balance of power in the global tech ecosystem.

The Unintended Consequences of Sanctions:

Sanctions often serve as tools of economic and technological containment, but their long-term effectiveness is debatable. Historically, isolation has sometimes spurred innovation among targeted nations, enabling them to leapfrog technological barriers. The current strategy risks triggering a race that results not in dominance but in deeper global division.

Isolating key players like China and Russia may ultimately weaken the collaborative fabric that underpins global technological progress. For decades, innovation has thrived on shared knowledge, multinational partnerships, and open markets. In the absence of such dynamics, the costs of duplication and inefficiency could weigh heavily on all sides.

A Pragmatic View of Geopolitical Strategy:

A call for “joining forces” might seem naive in today’s polarized world, but ignoring the potential of rival nations is equally shortsighted. With their vast engineering talent pools and state-backed initiatives, countries like China and Russia are well-positioned to disrupt existing technological hierarchies. Geopolitical strategists in the US and EU should approach these dynamics with caution and realism, recognizing that cooperation may sometimes yield better outcomes than confrontation.

The Road Ahead:

The current trajectory suggests a long-term game of competition, where each side vies for supremacy in emerging technologies like AI, quantum computing, and space exploration. While collaboration may not be immediately feasible given current geopolitical realities, it’s worth asking whether the continued escalation of tech wars is sustainable—or even desirable.

Even amid rivalry, there are opportunities for selective cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as climate change or cybersecurity. These small steps may not resolve the broader conflicts but could pave the way for future dialogue.

Conclusion:

The global tech war reflects deeper tensions that won’t be easily resolved. Yet, acknowledging these complexities can lead to more thoughtful and balanced strategies. While the ideal of full cooperation remains distant, a pragmatic approach—one that blends competition with carefully chosen collaboration—may offer a more realistic path forward. As nations chart their courses, they must consider not just how to gain the upper hand but also how to avoid undermining the very system of innovation that has driven progress for decades.

Trump won: what’s next?

I guess we are all digesting the result of the US elections now. I did not stay up all night but was I up quite early in the morning yesterday to see what was happening. A quick appraisal can be found on my LinkedIn page. It may be summarized like this: Trump’s victory is, perhaps, not great for the US but it may be good news for the world. Why am I saying that? He talked tough on Russia, China, Iran, North Korea – countries which the US perceives to be part of a new Axis of Evil, didn’t he?

My answer to that is: yes. Trump talks tough. But he usually talks about trade and economics rather than about war. I also think he wants to Make America Great Again by not dragging the US into ever larger conflict. That is why I think Trump will be good for world peace and prosperity.

There is another point I want to raise here. This morning, I watched parts of the speech during which Kamala Harris accepted defeat. It reminded me of why I do not like US politics. Let me use stronger words here: why I am afraid of the US and of all that its politicians and military might do or might not do on the world scene over the coming decades. It is this: this constant invocation of American exceptionalism.

Yes. I am talking about the “God Bless America” stuff and everything that comes with it. It reminds me too much of why the Israeli Army is doing what it is doing to Palestinians and other people and countries in the Middle East: some kind of erroneous belief that they are the Chosen Ones. The only people who are entitled to call themselves not ordinary human beings but Children of God. The US, its leaders, and its citizens are not exceptional. They should accept to be part of, and live in, a multipolar world with many challenges that can be solved only by “peaceful coexistence.”

Wow ! That’s a term used by Xi Jinping, isn’t it? It is. I truly hope Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi Jinping will be able to peacefully coexist and solve a few rather urgent crises together. Just a few. I do not expect any miracles.

A tragic historical role reversal

In 1948, one of the founding fathers of the European Union, Paul-Henri Spaak, made a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is referred to as the ‘Discours de la Peur’: the Discourse of Fear. It is one of those moments that may be associated with the start of the Cold War, and the breakdown of the international system that was put in place to prevent a new war. I read it again today, and I am thinking we might well substitute the Soviet Union for the United States in that speech. Let me do that by paraphrasing a few of his lines:

“I am scared. I am scared because the United States and Europe are in a undeclared war with Russia. I am scared because of the insane level of the United States’ defense budget and the insane level of arms and sophisticated weapon systems it supplies to third countries that cannot be said to be of strategic importance for our security. I am scared because, this year, critical energy infrastructure has been blown up, right in the heart of Europe, and one cannot accuse Russia of what happened there: it is an act of international terrorism that has been left unexamined. I am scared because a defensive alliance of democracies has become an offensive one. I am scared because of the belligerence of our leaders. I am scared because of the lack of democratic legitimacy of our political system, especially when it comes to questions of war and peace at our borders. I am scared because our discourse on rights, freedom, democracy, international trade and business has been contaminated with moral fascism, unwarranted protectionism, neo-colonialism and misplaced talk of empire.”

Text and video link to the speech:
https://lnkd.in/e9xAGUNA
https://lnkd.in/embs2TtR

Beyond Mariupol and the Krim

The battle for Mariupol resembles the WW II battle for Stalingrad both in its strategic as well as symbolic significance. For the Russians, it turned the tide after the frontal assault on major Ukrainian cities, including Kiev itself, stalled and, ultimately, turned into defeat and a full and complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the center and west of the country. They turned all of their military might to the east of Ukraine. Mariupol was the last city they had to take to clear the land corridor to the Krim and the Black Sea which – it would be foolish to deny this – is historically Russian. It also allowed Mr. Putin to effectively claim a victory on neo-Nazis, because the ideology of the Azov Regiment was effectively very right-wing – and that is a euphemism. It is also foolish to deny the support it got – since its creation in 2014 – from extremist groups abroad, and from the US in particular.

However, just a few days after the Russian Army could finally clear the Azovstal bunkers (19 May, to be precise) after rather enormous military efforts, Mr. Biden’s pushed a US$40 billion package through the US Congress – mainly military assistance. The initial David versus Goliath geometry between the Ukrainian and Russian armies has now been reversed completely: such packages are of the order of Russia’s entire annual defense budget. Another comparison to put these US$40b or 50 US$b figures into perspective is this: Belgium’s government decided – also as a result of what is seen as the new Russian threat – to invest about 10 billion Euro to replace its outdated defense equipment, but this investment program covers 10+ years (it runs till 2030) – so it amounts to about €1b per year. In contrast, the US delivers this immense support now, in just one go.

It amounts to this: in just a few months, the US has turned the Ukrainian army into one of the most modern and powerful armies of the world: Ukraine is now – for all practical purposes – a strong US ally outside of NATO and outside of the EU right in the heart of Asia. From a geopolitical point of view, its strategic location is even better than Afghanistan. Is that we Europeans wanted? I do not think so.

Yesterday (16 August), Putin accused the US to ‘drag out’ the war in Ukraine. I do not agree with most of his statements – and, to be fully clear, of course I condemn Russia’s invasion – but Mr. Putin is right here. Yesterday also, Finland – NATO’s new poster boy – imposed limitations on tourist visas for Russians, further antagonizing not Mr. Putin but ordinary Russians. Politicians all over the EU – but most vocally those from former satellites of the Soviet Union – call for tougher economic sanctions. Why? Economic warfare hurts us more than Russia, and reinforces Mr. Putin’s only appeal in his own country – which is that of a tough but reliable leader in very tough times (which is, by the way, the same image which Mr. Biden and Ms. Pelosi try to cultivate with their own constituencies back home now).

What is rather remarkable is that Mr. Putin did not see this coming: his own visit to Beijing just before his invasion (in February this year) was preceded by Mr. Zelensky going to Washington DC in September last year, purportedly sounding out the chances of Ukraine joining NATO. Mr. Putin cannot say he did not notice that because it was what led to him stationing and building up troops at Ukraine’s borders. Hence, looking back, one might look at all this as something that could be foreseen.

So what is next? I am not sure. Sun Tzu was a very wise general: one of the principles of his Art of War is that, in a war, the purpose is to defeat the enemy militarily. The objective is not to try to destroy him. That is exactly what we are trying to do now. It will fail, and it does nothing to work towards long-term peace on the European continent. There is hope, however. Little hope but whatever hope is there, we must highlight:

1. The UN Secretary General and Turkey are actively involved and working with Mr. Zelensky (and, hopefully, Mr. Putin) to work towards solidifying the grain exports deal and – hopefully – a ceasefire agreement. Rumors – credible rumors – have it that, in September or October, Russia will organize referenda in the areas that it currently is holding. Hopefully, Mr. Zelensky will see that it is in the interest of his country to work towards a ceasefire agreement before that happens. Mr. Putin has clearly signaled that he wants to talk: his 9 May public speech at the occasion of Russia’s national Victory Day was not belligerent. On the contrary, independent media analysts rightly marked it as “far from triumphant.”

2. Gerhard Schröder – one of the very few sensible great European politicians who is old enough to remember the Cold War back in the 1980s – has not been expelled from his party and is becoming increasingly vocal. He is right: the current madness must stop. Europe is not, and should not be, at war with Russia. We may not like it, but Russia is our neighbor, and we cannot move away from it. It is time for hawks to back off and tone down. The belligerent voices of a von der Leyen or a Josep Borrell do not represent what Europe – or NATO – should stand for: we are not at war with Russia. Ukraine is at war with Russia and, because of its huge military support, the US is now at war with Russia too. The EU must cut its umbilical cord with the US when it comes to this hot war and – more recently – the new cold war with China.

Yankee, please go home. Now! The US should not be barging around in the world as we Europeans did during colonial times. The Black Sea is Russian. The China Sea is Chinese. They must, of course, remain open and free for all trade and to all people – and both the East and the West should work together to ensure they remain that way. But we live in a multipolar and very multicultural world, with different political systems and very different relations and a very different distribution of geopolitical power now.

Not accepting that amounts to a new moral fascism which Europe and Europeans, having learned what it learned through the painful experiences of two 20th century world wars (the second following the first because we did not go for a genuine people-to-people peace with Germany), should not accept. I’ve used such strong wording a few times already and I got censured for it on LinkedIn, but I do not retract it. The US keeps investing in hard power. It is about time we start investing in soft power: brains, respect, and truly liberal (or, if you prefer that term: Western) values.

I am happy to see that Mr. Fukuyama now also sees his much proclaimed ‘end of ideology‘ cannot be imposed by the US. I quote one of his recent comments: “Expect more violence before America returns to sanity.” I hope more violence can be avoided. Hot or cold wars are the worst thing now as truly bright global citizens are trying to address much more important issues to avoid long-term disaster and the end to civilization and mankind as we know it – first and foremost things such as climate change and the rapid exhaustion of natural resources that do not belong to this but to future generations.

We all know the golden rule for people and states to avoid war: si vis pacem, para bellum (if you want peace, prepare for war). Today we should turn that on its head, in line with Sun Tzu’s advice: if you are at war, prepare for peace. It is about time that Europe’s politicians start doing that. I have no hope that America’s politicians will ever do that. We can only hope the Republicans take US Congress again in November’s mid-term elections and that we will see a bit more of a lame duck government in the US. That would be good for the world.

However, even that we cannot hope for: the praise of Republicans for Pelosi’s rash visit to Taiwan – which triggered this new Cold War with China – and the fact that both Democrats and Republicans overwhelmingly vote for further increases of US military expenditure and more arms shipments to Ukraine confirms US politicians are all on the same line when it comes to warmongering and creating new enemies. As such, they have – what irony of history – much in common with what is currently providing legitimacy for Mr. Putin: a rather recent survey (May-June) finds that over 75% of Russians now support Putin’s Ukraine war. That is an increase as compared to when the war started. I have no doubt the economic sanctions were very counterproductive in that way. The new sanctions, which target people-to-people exchanges such as tourism, will only cause further alienation, and a further increase in the above-mentioned numbers. If, as Mr. Biden did not imply just once but several times already, American support to Ukraine would also aim at some kind of regime change in Russia, what he and loyal allies are doing is producing exactly the opposite effect.

Post scriptum: We do need a new peace movement in Europe. I have read both Oppenheimer’s excellent biography (American Prometheus) as well as General Groves’ account of the Manhattan project (Now It Can Be Told: The Story Of The Manhattan Project), so what recently declassified reports on the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs (6 and 9 August 1945 – yes, another sad anniversary this month) reveal does not come as a surprise. Oppenheimer – after having turned into a anti-nuclear weapons activist (with other eminent scientists such as Einstein) – died a miserable death as a victim of McCarthyism in the 1950s.

General Groves received a Distinguished Service Medal and went into business, becoming part of what Eisenhower, in his rather alarming farewell address as President to the nation, referred to as the military-industrial establishment. A lot of old people start speaking up. One of them is the 82-year old Australian journalist, writer, scholar, and documentary filmmaker John Pilger. I warmly recommend watching his latest contributions to the debate. Yes: Yankee, please go home. And please take the nuclear weapons that have been stationed in Europe for too long now with you. :-/

We have anti-war and anti-US protests in Korea now as the US are about to launch their own military exercises close to China now. Where is the peace movement in Europe?

The new Cold War with Russia and China (and censorship on social media)

One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Russia and China engage in propaganda. The West, of course, does not. We only write about truth and peace and democracy. What nonsense! I reacted strongly – on my LinkedIn account – against what I perceive to be a new Cold War with Russia and China and – more to the point – how wrong it is to demonize not only leaders or systems but also people. Indeed, the Russian or Chinese people are not inherently bad and sanctions should, therefore, not be applied to people-to-people contacts, such as a ban on Russian tourism in Europe – which is currently being advocated by some European politicians (I am thinking of two new hawks here – both young, pretty and very woke, on the surface, at least).

My post was removed. See the screenshot below. It will not make me change my mind. On the contrary: I am someone who would rather defend or even exaggerate an unpopular view rather than adapt it to please the other side. It makes me feel that we live in dangerous times, and that free speech is under attack. Not only in the East but also in the West. This confirms what I wrote in previous posts. We are straight back where we were 50 years ago – right back to the old world order: a terribly Cold War. It is a Cold War with China, and a hot war with Russia too! I tell my children not to worry about it and just have fun but, deep inside, I feel very sad. It feels like this generation has failed on all fronts: climate change, peace, poverty, exclusion, etcetera. I hope the next generation will do better but, judging from what young and popular European politicians such as Kaja Kallas and Sanna Marin are pleading for, I have little hope.

They are supported very vocally by a majority of smart young business-minded people from former Eastern Europe as well as by very vocal Ukrainian migrants here. While I understand what they are saying, I would suggest they go back to their own country and make a difference there. We do not need more warmongering here in Europe.

As for social media censorship, some kind of regulation is obviously needed. We do not want senseless material to go viral. However, I feel the only way to keep it transparent is to do it like Twitter is doing it: they do not resort to trolling or patrolling threads and then randomly deleting tweets but just stick to clearly identify and labeling the source for what it is. For example: tweets by government officials (be they US, Chinese or Russian or whatever nationality) are clearly marked as such. Hence, exaggerated or weird claims are not being censored (removed) but their source is appropriately flagged. I like that. Facebook says it has policies in place that should filter things out but, whatever these policies are, they are not clear to me and I will, therefore, not use FB anymore for political comments.

I do not believe it is useful to try to actively filter out messages. Tracing and marking the source of a message should do. As far as I can see from my analysis while participating in Twitter discussion threads, Twitter is quite good at that. The interesting thing here is that both Russia and China have an official ban on Twitter but that the ban does not apply to government officials and that, in China and Russia itself, private users do circumvent the ban without too much trouble.

Elon Musk wrote that he was/is interested in acquiring Twitter because he wants to turn it into some kind of ‘absolutist free speech’ medium. Many people may think he cannot possibly be serious. Based on my (admittedly limited) experience with Twitter, I feel he has got a point. I like Twitter. As mentioned above, I feel that the regulation they have put in place is effective: clearly marking the nature of the source of a social media message is probably sufficient to make sure its readers read it with the “pinch of salt” that is required. I think the regulation of social media should be based on the Twitter model: one can write what he or she wants but you should identify yourself and what you stand for. The rest is for the reader to judge. We should not underestimate his or her intelligence and we should – surely – not judge in his or her stead.

You may not agree with my views above. That is fine. All that I am asking is that you question whatever would irk you and make you feel that I am totally wrong. If you come out of that exercise with a confirmation of your own views – even if they would be and remain diametrically opposed to mine – then that is fine. That is what rational discussion and finding a good middle ground through dialectical exchange is all about.

Post scriptum: You may think I should request a second look at the case from the LinkedIn editors. I did. I used their appeal procedure, and wrote this as justification for asking a review for the removal of my comments:

“I know my comment is a minority view but I wrote it because I feel it is true and because I feel I must go against the grain of sentiment here. I am one of few Europeans who have seen the horrors of war up close and who – unlike some of the people who may find it offensive – did not flee Ukraine but went to fight there. I came back. Alive and sane. Yesterday I was told some of my friends are dead or lost limbs. I think you should look at the Twitter model for weeding out comments. They label content as offensive or clearly mark the nature of the source. I wrote about that on my political blog just now: https://webeu.news/. I am fine with clear feedback: perhaps LinkedIn is not the fora for such discussions. However, I do not see why there should be no equal treatment of majority and minority views.”

I am curious to see if they will reply and, if so, what they will do or write. As for now, I will refrain from further posts or comments on political issues on that channel. It is not good for my business anyway, so I should not bother and do what is right for me. 🙂

The end of ideology and the (ir)relevance of NATO

Shortly after the Berlin Wall came down, the US-led alliance of nations that is known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pushed the eastern borders of its territory all the way up to what are now the western borders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. [Instead of NATO, I could have referred to ‘the West’ as a whole, but it is better to be precise when writing about these things.] It is a rather moot point whether or not such expansion was tacitly agreed with the leaders of what was then a rapidly disintegrating Soviet Union. In 2014, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said that NATO’s enlargement was, quite simply, “not discussed at all” at the time, so we should probably leave the historical discussion at that.

One thing is quite clear, however: no one in Europe thought Ukraine was part of Europe until Mr. Putin decided to invade it. That is the number one reason why NATO refused to get involved in it: the ‘in’ or ‘out’ of area distinction is just a legal nicety which NATO (the US, I should say) uses as it pleases. Indeed, NATO went to Afghanistan so there is no reason why they should not go to some other area if NATO member countries would agree on going there. Personally, I think it is a very wise decision for NATO members to leave NATO out of the war between Ukraine and Russia. Furthermore, from the historical record, it may not be very clear that NATO would be pushing east, but one thing that is very clear is that NATO would not turn against Russia. So what is it that I want to say here?

I just want to illustrate such things are a matter of choice and, at the same time, question the relevance of NATO: if NATO is not there to defend us against potential Russian aggression, then what is its use? The only reasonable answer is: NATO is there to do whatever the US wants its European partners to do with it, and they can decide to go along with it or not to go along with it. If Europe is serious about European defense integration, then we should cut the umbilical cord with the US.

Think of it. Shortly after the Berlin Wall came down, political philosophers (read: ideologues) like Fukuyama mourned or, more likely, celebrated the ‘end of ideology’. Fukuyama, for example, wrote this: humanity has reached “not just … the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: That is, the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Thirty years later, history proved him wrong: unlike the Soviet Union, China did not disintegrate. It successfully suppressed the Tiananmen protests and it restructured its economic and political system, in a very unique model which you may or, more probably, may not want to qualify as liberal. I think of this as follows:

1. From an economic point of view, it is probably more liberal than any other system (just care about money, business and wealth production).

2. From a political point of view, the system is not what many casual observers think it is: China’s one-party system clearly allows for different opinions being expressed internally and fierce competition from within the system. Otherwise China would not be where it is now. Also, I have had the pleasure to interact with Chinese diplomats in Asia (12 years of diplomacy, which ended in Afghanistan) and I found they suffered less from the typical ‘groupthink’ problem that marks some other diplomatic corpses.

In any case, what is obvious is that its system is, by far, more successful than the Anglo-Saxon (US or UK) or European system, as evidenced by the fact that China, over the past decades, grew to become the largest economy in the world. Indeed, China’s GDP is now commensurate with its population: measured in purchasing power parity terms, it is the largest in the world. Back in 1989, China’s GDP was only ninth in the rankings. So are we or are we not witnessing the end of ideology or – worse – the end of history, or not?

The answer is rather obvious to me: history never ends (it was so foolish to write something like that) and, therefore, our views on how to manage our societies will also continue to conflict. In that sense, we are surely not witnessing any end to ideology. If anything, that is what the recent clash around the US and China is all about. Truly wise political philosophers should just observe current international realities: the world has, de facto, become multipolar. It is one interconnected world indeed, but it is comprised of many cultures and very different political and economic systems. Such diversity is good.

So, yes, while we are not seeing the end of ideology, we should move beyond ideology and focus on peaceful coexistence and finally be very serious about working towards “the greatest good for the greatest number”, as Jeremy Bentham – the father of liberalism, utilitarianism and pragmatism – said we should aim at above anything else. That means, among other things, working with rather than against China. And it surely means refraining from any aggression or interference in the internal matters of other countries – especially those countries that, through sheer hard work, have seen their wealth growth to levels that are at par of the wealth of the West.

Also, when war is inevitable – as it was between Ukraine and Russia this year – then one should respond firmly (as Europe and the US did) but one should also prepare for armistice and peace as soon as possible. That is not happening now: shipping US$40b arms packages to Ukraine is not what is needed now. For those who are not familiar with such numbers: the annual defense budget of Russia is about US$65b and most of that is spent on salaries: not on highly lethal offensive equipment. So, yes, such interventions totally reversed the initial perception of a David versus Goliath relation between Russia and Ukraine: Ukraine is now, by far, the most powerful army in Europe, and it is not because of NATO or European support. It is because the US took over. That is a fact. Do we want that? Possibly. We just need to be aware of it.

The frontlines are all but frozen now, and the US and Europe need to work with China to end the war. Through hard-nosed diplomacy rather than more sabre-rattling. More sanctions do not only hurt ourselves but – more importantly – risk alienating Russia (not only its leaders but – much more importantly – their citizens) to a point of no return. That is not what we want: Russia is and remains our neighbor, and – just like individuals – countries need to learn how to live with their neighbors. :-/

Post scriptum: When you are a European or an American reading this, you may be irked and think that I think of the Chinese way of living as, somehow, being superior to ours. I do not. I lived in Asia for a long time (20+ years), and I also lived in the US (Washington DC) for a couple of years (I was married to an American woman). Now I live in Brussels. In the country where I was born and grew up: Flanders, Belgium, Europe (Europeans have multi-layered identities, don’t they?). I think of it as the best place in the world, but that is probably because, yes, I was born and grew up here. There is no place like home and, yes, ‘home’ is, of course, a very different place for all of us – just like family is different for all of us. That is good. That is how it should be. That is why the world is such fun place and why wars should be avoided at all costs: war destroys homes and families. I have witnessed that in Afghanistan and in Ukraine. I have seen enough of it.

Just for the record, I add a personal note on why I think I should speak up in regard to the need to seek peace with Russia. I left for Ukraine as soon as President Zelensky made his appeal to European and other international volunteers to join the fight. I would have stayed on (many left after the terrifying strike on the Yavoriv base, but I did not) but, sadly, when seeing lots of idiot volunteers and private companies and militias from the US swamping in about a month after we had arrived, I thought it was no longer worth it: we are all ready to die for the right cause but if, I use Sun Tzu’s words here, you no longer find yourself on the right side of the Moral Law, then it is better to go home. From a practical point of view, the Ukraine-Russia war is now a war between Russia on one side, and Ukraine and the US on the other. It is no longer the war between Russia and Europe that our media pretend it to be. Here too, I do not mince my words: Yankee, go home. Please. We Europeans can and will deal with Russia. They are our neighbor. We will find a way. How?

Well, for starters, the EU’s relationship with the country that now has the most leverage on Russia (yes, China) has remained relatively unaffected. Let us bank on that to begin with. I also think Europe’s diplomats do not have the kind of ‘with or against us’ attitude that is so harmful in such situations. Let me be blunt here: European diplomats do not display arrogance and are not complacent. That is why Chinese and Russian diplomats will probably find it easier to talk to them. If your only tool is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail. So, if your only tool is a gun, then… Well… Then everyone looks like your enemy, right? Europeans do not think like that. Why? History: this continent remembers its wars and has learnt from them. Unlike the US, Europe did not go to war again after WW II (except for the Korean war, perhaps, as part of the United Nations). The US has fought many wars in foreign lands since then, and participated in even more proxy wars during the Cold War. These wars have been everything but successful, and I see little or no learning from them at all. :-/