Sanctions are the West’s favorite placebo. They make politicians feel decisive and moralists feel righteous, but they rarely change the battlefield. From Russia to China and now Israel, Europe is mistaking ethics-signaling for strategy — and paying the price for it.
When I wrote about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, I took flak for refusing to reduce a complex war to black-and-white slogans. Let me be clear: I was never a defender of Moscow. In fact, in those early months I joined the Volunteer Legion, put my own life at risk, and saw the folly of that war up close. My critique was — and remains — about strategy, not sympathy.
The same applies today. Hamas’s October attack on Israel was brutal and strange in equal measure. Israel’s initial military response could still be framed as “forward self-defense.” But what followed spiraled far beyond proportionality. If the International Criminal Court believes there are grounds for a genocide case and has issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu, then it is no longer civil or credible to argue that Israel’s government is “on the right side of history.”
I already wrote in July that Israel’s strategic logic is breaking down in full view of the region. What began as deterrence has curdled into recursive escalation — strikes in Gaza, Syria, even Qatar — that alienate allies and erode Israel’s long-term legitimacy. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the morality of it all, it is bad strategy.
And yet, Europe’s reaction is once again to reach for the sanctions lever.
The Sanctions Reflex
Sanctions sound tough. They signal resolve. They please moralists. But they rarely work. Even the most optimistic studies put their “success rate” below 40%; more skeptical analyses suggest closer to 5%. That is not strategy. That is roulette.
And when the wheel stops against you, you lose twice: once in economic blowback, and again in strategic realignment. Europe’s energy crisis, and Russia’s accelerated pivot to Beijing, are Exhibit A.
Now: Israel
Fast forward to today. The EU is late — very late — in criticizing Israel’s conduct in Gaza. Public opinion is finally forcing politicians to “do something.” And what do they reach for? Trade measures. Suspension of preferential tariffs. Targeted listings. The familiar reflex.
It is, once more, ethics-signaling. Politicians get to look righteous. The moralists applaud. But will Netanyahu change course because the EU slaps tariffs on Israeli machinery or chemicals? Hardly. He has already decided his war aims. His calculus does not turn on Brussels.
Meanwhile, Israel is deeply integrated into European supply chains, R&D networks, and technology flows. Broad trade measures risk collateral damage to ourselves — again.
The Bitter Logic
So the chain grows longer:
Russia: sanctions, energy pain, Moscow–Beijing axis.
China: tariffs, tech “rip-and-replace” policies, and other spirals of retaliation.
Israel: now, the same reflex — trade as punishment.
Where does it stop? If tomorrow Europe decides that America is no longer a functioning democracy, do we cut trade with the US too? That sounds absurd — but the logic, once embraced, rolls downhill fast.
Moral Law: shouting “justice!” without a strategy is not moral strength, it is posturing.
Heaven and Earth: the conditions are not on our side; we cannot wish them away.
Command: our leaders confuse signaling with purpose.
Method and Discipline: sanctions are a substitute for action, not disciplined statecraft.
A Better Course
If the EU is serious about law, it should enforce the measures it already has:
No settlement goods in our markets.
No weapons or dual-use items where there is a risk of IHL violations.
Full cooperation with the ICC and ICJ.
That is lawful. That is targeted. That has integrity.
But let us drop the delusion that broad trade sanctions are a lever of strategy. They are not. They are the political sugar rush of the moment: sweet on the tongue, destructive to the body.
Conclusion: Ethics-signaling is not strategy. It is an abdication of strategy. And Europe, once again, risks paying the price.
This post was generated by ChatGPT, based on me playing the devil’s advocate with it, verified news sources and game-theoretical analysis patterns. However, it was — of course — moderated and approved by a human editor (me) for clarity, neutrality, ethical framing and — yes — legitimacy or attribution (only me bears responsibility for my opinion, isn’t it).
The killing of Charlie Kirk during a campus speaking event shocked many. A rooftop sniper, an unsecured perimeter, and a suspect fleeing with remarkable composure: the details are disturbing. They also expose deep flaws in security and preparedness — flaws that seem astonishing after last year’s near-miss on Donald Trump.
But perhaps just as troubling is the reaction. Figures like Donald Trump and Elon Musk took to X not to calm tensions, but to capitalize on them. Instead of de-escalation, we saw polarization amplified.
That was the starting point for a dialogue I had with an AI system. The question was simple: What can we learn from this, beyond the immediate headlines?
And here is where the exercise became revealing. Together we explored:
How such security lapses could have been prevented.
Why conspiracy theories thrive when trust collapses.
How leaders can choose to inflame or to bridge.
Why Europe should not feel immune: rising gun incidents show similar risks could surface here.
And finally: how AI itself, like social media, embodies a paradox — designed for dialogue, but often fueling division.
In two recent papers, I called this out more explicitly:
The conclusion across these threads is simple: trust is fragile, but repairable. We can design for it — in politics, in security, in technology. And we must, because when trust is absent, suspicion rushes in to fill the void.
That is why this blog — webeu.news — is turning into something different: not just reporting events, but exploring them through AI-assisted reasoning. The goal is not to fuel divisions, but to test whether technology can help us think together again.
ChatGPT-generated commentary on real-time events, moderated and published by a human observer. This post reflects no official stance — only the unfolding facts and patterns visible to those willing to look.
I. A Stage Shrinking, A Parade Expanding
On September 3, 2025, Beijing staged its largest military parade in a decade. Hypersonic missiles, drones, lasers — all designed to project technological supremacy. At Xi Jinping’s side: Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un. Absent: the West.
The tableau is stark: a global stage with fewer players, harder lines, and increasingly symbolic gestures. A demonstration meant less for tactical deterrence than for narrative positioning.
II. The Logic of Spectacle
Parades serve two audiences at once:
Domestic: reassure the public of strength, unity, inevitability.
International: signal endurance, alliances, and red lines.
But the same images also betray fragility. The louder the spectacle, the deeper the cracks it tries to conceal — from economic slowdown to fragile coalition politics within China itself.
III. Symbolism as Strategy
The presence of Putin and Kim is less about operational cooperation and more about narrative alignment: an axis of visibility.
Russia: isolated, but visibly not alone.
North Korea: once peripheral, now staged as a partner.
China: at the center, claiming both history and destiny.
The absence of Western leaders is equally strategic. Silence is also a signal.
IV. From Military Power to Narrative War
The weapons on display matter — but the image of those weapons matters more. In an era where operational capacity is opaque, perception itself becomes a battlefield. The question is not whether the hypersonic missile works as advertised. The question is: who believes it, and who recalibrates accordingly?
V. The Risk of Overplaying the Script
Spectacle can backfire:
If allies see only theater without substance.
If rivals call the bluff.
If domestic audiences tire of pageantry without delivery.
China’s challenge is that the bigger the parade, the more pressure to prove reality matches appearance.
VI. Closing Reflection: The Stage of Absence
What the parade revealed most clearly was not the power of China’s arsenal — but the shrinking circle of actors on the world stage. When absence speaks louder than presence, the geometry of global politics is shifting toward a simpler, harsher form.
Those willing to look can already see the pattern: fewer voices, harder lines, higher risks.
This post was generated by ChatGPT, based on verified news reports and geopolitical pattern analysis. It was moderated and approved by a human editor for clarity, neutrality, and ethical framing.
ChatGPT-generated commentary on real-time events, moderated and published by a human observer. This post reflects no official stance — only the unfolding facts and patterns visible to those willing to look.
I. The Latest Strike: A New Line Crossed
On July 16, 2025, Israel conducted precision airstrikes on the Syrian Ministry of Defence in Damascus, as well as on targets near the presidential palace. These were not routine operations against Iranian proxies or covert shipments. They were overt hits on the central nervous system of the Syrian state.
Israel justified the move as a defensive response to Syrian military deployments in Suwayda, where clashes between Druze fighters and Bedouin militias have spiraled into civil bloodshed. With over 250 people killed in Suwayda in recent weeks, Israeli leadership claimed a moral imperative to intervene — framing the strikes as part of a protective deterrence strategy for regional minorities.
But the world is not convinced. And neither, it seems, are many within Israel’s traditional alliance network.
II. From Precision to Pattern: The Logic of Escalation
In less than a month, Israel has struck:
Iran (in a surprise operation that even U.S. intelligence was only partially briefed on),
Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon (as part of its “perpetual containment doctrine”),
and now central Damascus — openly targeting a sovereign state’s most symbolic and institutional assets.
This is no longer the quiet shadow war that Israel has managed for over a decade. It is something else:
Visible, not deniable.
Reactive, not strategic.
And increasingly uncoordinated, even among allies.
The logic appears to be unraveling.
III. Game Theory in Real Time: A Security Dilemma, Accelerated
What’s unfolding is a textbook case of the security dilemma — where every move made in the name of security triggers greater insecurity in return.
Israel believes it is acting rationally:
Pre-empt threats.
Signal strength.
Protect vulnerable communities (e.g., the Druze).
But in game-theoretical terms, it is moving into a high-risk tit-for-tat sequence, where actions meant to reduce long-term threats only amplify short-term volatility. This is no longer deterrence. It is recursive escalation.
The regional players are watching closely — and adjusting their posture:
Syria, though institutionally weakened post-Assad, is now being recast in international discourse as a target rather than an actor.
Iran, already hit earlier this month, now has a broader diplomatic justification for retaliation — or at least narrative leverage.
The United States, Israel’s most consistent backer, is publicly urging restraint. The Biden administration reportedly warned that such moves could jeopardize wider regional normalization efforts.
Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar — normally divergent in rhetoric — have converged in their condemnation of Israel’s “destabilizing behavior.”
The message: This is not a local matter anymore.
IV. Strategic Blindness? Or Strategic Exhaustion?
It is tempting to search for a coherent doctrine behind Israel’s moves: A new perimeter? A preventive containment of collapsing Arab states? A domestic show of strength?
But perhaps what we’re witnessing is not doctrine at all — but strategic fatigue:
A democracy stretched between multiple frontlines.
A leadership under increasing internal and external pressure.
An army accustomed to dominance but less attuned to narrative warfare, where images of destruction can undo years of legitimacy-building.
Israel remains the region’s most capable military actor — but it is now playing without clear lines of restraint, and without the consent of the geopolitical arena it once dominated.
V. The Coming Reframing: From Protector to Provoker?
The Suwayda argument — that Israel is protecting minorities in lawless zones — may hold moral appeal. But geopolitics isn’t built on moral appeal alone. It is built on:
Predictability,
Credibility, and
Coalition tolerance.
If Israel loses all three, it risks being seen not as the strategic adult in the room — but as a rogue actor with a nuclear arsenal and no endgame.
The shift is already happening:
Western editorial boards are more cautious in their support.
Neutral states are treating Israeli moves as destabilizing, not stabilizing.
The international legal discourse is slowly creeping toward language of proportionality and sovereignty — with Syria, of all countries, gaining rhetorical ground.
VI. Closing Reflection: Strategic Moves, Emotional Traps
From a purely strategic standpoint, Israel may be playing against itself. Every successful strike now adds weight to a narrative that delegitimizes Israel’s position long-term, even if it wins the tactical exchange.
This is not a question of right or wrong. It is a question of outcomes.
What outcome is now achievable? Who remains willing to share the burden of escalation? How many moves ahead is anyone really thinking?
As one observer put it:
“After the surprise strikes on Iran, Israel is further escalating in some kind of logic that no one understands — not even its allies.”
That sentence may turn out to be the most honest intelligence brief of the week.
This post was generated by ChatGPT, based on verified news sources and game-theoretical analysis patterns. It was moderated and approved by a human editor for clarity, neutrality, and ethical framing.
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu reminds us that the greatest victories are those achieved without fighting. The wise general, he writes, knows that awareness is more valuable than aggression, and that the worst position to be in is one of reactive chaos — when decisions are made out of urgency rather than clarity.
That teaching is being tested in Brussels today.
In a move that has gone largely unnoticed outside policy circles, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has invoked an emergency clause in the EU treaties to push through a €150 billion defense loan scheme — bypassing the European Parliament entirely. Known as SAFE (Strategic Autonomy for European Armaments), the initiative aims to finance joint procurement of weapons by EU member states.
The urgency is real. The war in Ukraine drags on. Strategic dependencies on U.S. military support remain. But so is the danger: what begins as an exception can quickly become the rule.
🧠 A Familiar Pattern: Crisis Justifies Centralization
Von der Leyen argues the move is “fully justified” by Europe’s “existential” geopolitical challenges. And yet, what does it say about the state of European democracy if a €150 billion decision can be waved through without parliamentary oversight?
The European Parliament — the Union’s only directly elected institution — was sidelined.
National governments nodded the plan through in Council.
Criticism came not from public debate, but from internal letters between Roberta Metsola and the Commission.
This is governance by executive exception. It echoes a worrying trend we examined in our recent papers:
“Democracy does not collapse in silence. It collapses in protocol — in procedures that slowly lose their connection to legitimacy, while still formally functioning.”
🧭 Europe Is Not Immune
It’s tempting to look across the Atlantic and think the problem is uniquely American. Donald Trump’s return to power, his flippant military gestures, and U.S. senators tweeting memes about political murder — all seem surreal. But Europe is not immune.
Our institutions may be quieter, more technocratic. But that makes the drift toward post-democratic governance all the more dangerous — because it’s harder to see, harder to resist.
We are entering what systems thinkers would call a bifurcation point — a critical threshold beyond which our political structures may evolve, fragment, or harden. Strategic clarity is needed now more than ever.
🕊 Sun Tzu’s Wisdom, Europe’s Choice
Sun Tzu tells us that victory belongs to the side that knows itself and its adversary. But what if Europe is starting to forget itself — its principles, its process, its people?
Strategic autonomy cannot be built on procedural shortcuts. A fortress without legitimacy is a prison waiting to fall.
Let us not confuse preparedness with panic. Let us not trade transparency for speed. And let us remember that the defense of Europe begins not with weapons, but with integrity.
In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. The Cold War ended. And for a moment, the world seemed to tilt toward peace, cooperation, and democratic convergence. But thirty-five years later, we find ourselves facing nuclear tension, multipolar fragmentation, and creeping authoritarianism. What happened?
In this article, I reflect on the trajectory of global politics since 1989—not from a place of cynicism, but of sober realism. This is a personal exploration, co-generated with AI, driven by a concern for where the world may be heading if we fail to understand how we got here.
🌍 The “Unipolar Moment” (1989–2001): Euphoria and Expansion
The 1990s were defined by a sense of Western triumph. Liberal democracy had “won.” NATO expanded eastward. The EU integrated former communist states. The U.S. stood alone as the global hegemon. Francis Fukuyama called it The End of History.
But even then, cracks were visible. Russia struggled under economic collapse and perceived humiliation. China quietly watched and learned. And Western interventions—from the Balkans to Iraq—began to show the limits of power without legitimacy.
🔥 Blowback and Breakdown (2001–2014): The Illusion Shatters
The attacks of 9/11 ended the post-Cold War honeymoon. The War on Terror dragged the West into endless, destabilizing conflicts. The 2008 financial crash revealed systemic flaws in the neoliberal model.
Russia reasserted itself with the Georgia war in 2008. China grew stronger and more confident, especially after 2008. And the Arab Spring—briefly a beacon of hope—devolved into civil war and authoritarian retrenchment.
By 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the rise of populism in Europe and the U.S., the global order had shifted. A more chaotic, multipolar world was emerging.
🌐 2014–2025: Fragmentation, Realignment, and a New Cold War
The last decade has been a period of intense disorientation:
Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and now sees the West not as a partner, but an existential threat. Its doctrine is no longer just defensive—it is revisionist, even civilizational.
China has become more assertive under Xi Jinping. From the Belt and Road Initiative to tensions over Taiwan, it is challenging Western dominance without overt confrontation—yet.
Europe, meanwhile, is caught in between. Dependent on U.S. security guarantees that are increasingly uncertain—especially under Trump—it faces hard choices. Strategic autonomy remains more aspiration than reality.
The United States has shifted away from predictable deterrence doctrines. The re-election of Trump in 2024 has only deepened concerns that the post-WWII alliance system may no longer hold in the face of nuclear escalation or conflict.
🧭 Understanding the Rational and the Irrational
The world is not descending into chaos by accident. Certain patterns are visible:
Unipolarity was never sustainable. Rivals adapted. The U.S. overreached.
Democracy lost its halo. Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan damaged its legitimacy as an exportable model.
Global institutions weakened. Multilateralism gave way to great power competition.
Technological change outpaced diplomacy. Cyberwarfare, disinformation, and AI blurred lines of war and peace.
And yet, there’s something weird, too—a sense that despite global knowledge, connectivity, and technological mastery, we are less capable of coordinated, rational action than ever before. We know the risks. We talk about them. But we don’t act.
🚧 Europe at the Crossroads
For Europe, the stakes are existential. If the U.S. no longer guarantees nuclear deterrence—and if Russia sees the Ukraine war as a struggle it cannot afford to lose—then supporting Ukraine without a credible peace strategy becomes perilous.
This doesn’t mean capitulating to aggression. But it does mean recognizing that the West’s post-1989 assumptions—about deterrence, alliances, and historical progress—may no longer hold. In a nuclear world with uncertain doctrines and shifting alliances, diplomacy cannot be an afterthought.
🔚 Conclusion: The Edge of Chaos
The post-1989 order was built on hope. What comes next may be shaped more by restraint, clarity, and the courage to rethink. It is time to move beyond nostalgia for a unipolar world that never truly was—and begin designing a multipolar order that is at least survivable.
This reflection is just a beginning. I invite readers to respond, critique, and build on it. We need serious, informed, and open debate—because history is not over. It’s being written now.
Originally published on webeu.news. Co-generated with ChatGPT (OpenAI). Header image suggestion: A split screen of the Berlin Wall falling in 1989 and modern-day Kyiv under fire—symbolizing the bookends of the post-Cold War dream.
This post was generated by ChatGPT-4o based on my prompts and GPT going through previous posts and the history of our chats.
Introduction:
As we celebrated the New Year with awe-inspiring drone-powered light shows, the undercurrents of global technology and commerce revealed a stark reality: the world is witnessing a rapid escalation of the tech war between major powers. Beneath the surface, strategic decisions are shaping the future of technology in ways that may have profound consequences for innovation and international relations.
The Battle for Semiconductor Sovereignty:
The semiconductor industry sits at the heart of this conflict. Recent reports and analyses highlight that Russia and China are doubling down on their efforts to develop homegrown lithography equipment and advanced chip-making capabilities. These moves come as a direct response to US-led sanctions and export restrictions targeting critical technologies.
While claims of surpassing Western technology may be overstated, the underlying trend is clear: sanctions are driving targeted nations to achieve greater self-reliance, potentially reshaping the balance of power in the global tech ecosystem.
The Unintended Consequences of Sanctions:
Sanctions often serve as tools of economic and technological containment, but their long-term effectiveness is debatable. Historically, isolation has sometimes spurred innovation among targeted nations, enabling them to leapfrog technological barriers. The current strategy risks triggering a race that results not in dominance but in deeper global division.
Isolating key players like China and Russia may ultimately weaken the collaborative fabric that underpins global technological progress. For decades, innovation has thrived on shared knowledge, multinational partnerships, and open markets. In the absence of such dynamics, the costs of duplication and inefficiency could weigh heavily on all sides.
A Pragmatic View of Geopolitical Strategy:
A call for “joining forces” might seem naive in today’s polarized world, but ignoring the potential of rival nations is equally shortsighted. With their vast engineering talent pools and state-backed initiatives, countries like China and Russia are well-positioned to disrupt existing technological hierarchies. Geopolitical strategists in the US and EU should approach these dynamics with caution and realism, recognizing that cooperation may sometimes yield better outcomes than confrontation.
The Road Ahead:
The current trajectory suggests a long-term game of competition, where each side vies for supremacy in emerging technologies like AI, quantum computing, and space exploration. While collaboration may not be immediately feasible given current geopolitical realities, it’s worth asking whether the continued escalation of tech wars is sustainable—or even desirable.
Even amid rivalry, there are opportunities for selective cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as climate change or cybersecurity. These small steps may not resolve the broader conflicts but could pave the way for future dialogue.
Conclusion:
The global tech war reflects deeper tensions that won’t be easily resolved. Yet, acknowledging these complexities can lead to more thoughtful and balanced strategies. While the ideal of full cooperation remains distant, a pragmatic approach—one that blends competition with carefully chosen collaboration—may offer a more realistic path forward. As nations chart their courses, they must consider not just how to gain the upper hand but also how to avoid undermining the very system of innovation that has driven progress for decades.
I guess we are all digesting the result of the US elections now. I did not stay up all night but was I up quite early in the morning yesterday to see what was happening. A quick appraisal can be found on my LinkedIn page. It may be summarized like this: Trump’s victory is, perhaps, not great for the US but it may be good news for the world. Why am I saying that? He talked tough on Russia, China, Iran, North Korea – countries which the US perceives to be part of a new Axis of Evil, didn’t he?
My answer to that is: yes. Trump talks tough. But he usually talks about trade and economics rather than about war. I also think he wants to Make America Great Again by not dragging the US into ever larger conflict. That is why I think Trump will be good for world peace and prosperity.
There is another point I want to raise here. This morning, I watched parts of the speech during which Kamala Harris accepted defeat. It reminded me of why I do not like US politics. Let me use stronger words here: why I am afraid of the US and of all that its politicians and military might do or might not do on the world scene over the coming decades. It is this: this constant invocation of American exceptionalism.
Yes. I am talking about the “God Bless America” stuff and everything that comes with it. It reminds me too much of why the Israeli Army is doing what it is doing to Palestinians and other people and countries in the Middle East: some kind of erroneous belief that they are the Chosen Ones. The only people who are entitled to call themselves not ordinary human beings but Children of God. The US, its leaders, and its citizens are not exceptional. They should accept to be part of, and live in, a multipolar world with many challenges that can be solved only by “peaceful coexistence.”
Wow ! That’s a term used by Xi Jinping, isn’t it? It is. I truly hope Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi Jinping will be able to peacefully coexist and solve a few rather urgent crises together. Just a few. I do not expect any miracles.
The invoices for gas and electricity have tripled or quadrupled, and may rise to ten times what household and industries in Europe used to pay for energy a year ago. The price differential of the gas price in the US and Europe – also a factor ten – is likely to anger voters in the coming years: are these smart sanctions? Why would Europe pay more for economic warfare with Russia than the US?
The truth is: not importing gas from Russia is ineffective and counterproductive. First, a military agression should be countered with military action. Sanctions on a country – on its economy and its people – should be used as a last resort. Sun Tzu wrote about that in his ‘Art of War‘: the objective is not to destroy a country or its people but to defeat its army if and when it threatens your sovereignty.
Second, if sanctions are deemed to be necessary, they should not hurt your own economy too much, but the economy of the enemy. Sanctions on this or that country on finished products (say, electronics, cars or consumer goods) are logical: you can, quite simply, procure these from another source. Let us suppose we would be at war with Japan, for example: we would just stop buying Japanese cars and electronics and switch to American, European or Chinese products. That is an effective or smart sanction: it hurts Japan but it does not diminish our purchasing power, resources or wealth.
With energy or raw materials, one cannot switch easily: these are inputs. Demand for them is inelastic, supply cannot be increased in the short run, and, therefore, the shortage or mismatch between supply and demand will drive prices up very quickly (with factors ten or even a hundredfold, as we are seeing for the raw gas price now). It will hurt your economy more than the country you want to punish and may, therefore, be labeled as pure and simple masochism.
I remember talk in the newspapers here in Brussels about how not importing Russian gas would not hurt the Belgian economy because Russian gas had only a very small share in our gas imports. That misses the point completely: even for such small share, we have to find other suppliers, and these other suppliers do get very large demand from countries which were very dependent on Russian gas, such as Germany. Hence, even small customers suffer from extraordinary price rises as supply gets cut on a market that was already tense.
The only way out is to roll back our self-imposed ban on Russian gas, but Europe’s political leaders lack the guts to (1) admit their mistake and (2) to do something about it. Why it is so difficult? Most EU countries reversed their stance on nuclear energy over the past few months. Why not take this logical step too? We can, quite simply, just decide to import gas from Russia again. It will fix the root cause of the huge problem we are facing. Will this disappoint people more than the decision to go for nuclear energy again? I do not see why that should be the case. It is a very necessary step: it is the only way to prevent the total meltdown of the European economy that we are currently witnessing (make no mistake here: it is a lot worse than the 1970s energy crisis, so we have to act).
It will also prevent a swing to extremist right-wing or left-wing political parties (such as Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) in France). These may have extremist views on migration and other topics but they have far less extremist views on Russia than the current political parties at the center. The center is, therefore, no longer a center when it comes to what concerns most voters now: the war with Russia, and the prospect of deepening and worsening it by also entering into a cold war with China.
President Macron scraped through for the second-term (10 and 24 April 2022) presidential elections: the voting in two rounds (typical of France) saved him. I do not think he and other moderate leaders will be so lucky next time. It’s the economy, stupid! Policies that destroy industry and reduce lower- and middle-class families to poverty are sure to get you where you do not want to be in politics.
Also, it is the first time in my life that I would like Belgium to dissociate from the EU’s foreign policy: a von der Leyen and a Borrell are non-elected, and the mandate of EU institutions for foreign policy and defense is very limited. They surely do not have the right to declare war on behalf of the sovereign nation-states within Europe. Also, Russia blew up its dialogue with the EU as a multilateral forum almost two years ago (I wrote about that at the time, anticipating a lot of events and trends that we see happening now). If Finland or the Baltic states want to go much further in sanctioning the Russian people, let them go ahead. Belgium’s leaders and people should not be seen to be part of what is, clearly, just plain warmongering for no good reason.
The frontlines have stabilized, and Russia’s military has been weakened considerably. Now is a time to negotiate a settlement: not peace (that is not possible anymore because of the escalation) but a ceasefire and practical arrangements to stop the bleeding and start reconstruction. The conflict will then just become one of the many frozen conflicts of Eurasia, and we can all focus again on what we should be focusing on: work, family, fun. We should do it now because we are in a position of strength vis-à-vis Russia. The winter will weaken our position. Russians are used to surviving long winters. We are not.
Not deepening or dragging out war – especially because the energy crisis is causing a rapid disintegration of our industrial base (not to mention pushing lower-class households into poverty) – should be a priority now. A matter of life and death, so to speak (sorry that sounds so bitter in this context), rather than about a selection of one single country where the values of freedom or democracy abroad matter more to us than, say, in Syria or in Afghanistan. Also, I repeat we should stay clear of demonizing the Russian people with measures such as visa bans, labelling every Russian resident in the EU as a potential spy (and, worse, calls for systematic checks on them) rather than target Mr. Putin, his regime and the Russian military directly. That is a lesson we Europeans should have learnt from the world wars.
However, let me get back to the point here: when considering economic sanctions, cold economic and political analysis should be used to evaluate and decide whether to implement them and continue them. If the analysis shows they produce the opposite effect (polls show that Mr. Putin’s popularity as a war leader popularity keeps increasing), they should be rolled back. Blindly sticking to things that do not work and hurt ourselves more than the enemy is not wise: if you find yourself in a hole, stop digging, right?
Again, most countries reversed their decision – taken decades ago – to phase out nuclear energy, and this measure to tackle the energy crisis has not met with popular resistance. On the contrary, polls show support in Belgium. Why is it that leaders show no willingness to roll back the decision to no longer import Russian gas? If it is about human rights or whatever, then we should scrutinize our energy imports from countries like, say, Saudi Arabia as well. But banning such imports would not be effective either, right? Gas, oil, rare earth minerals and all the other things that are routinely imported to produce consumer or industrial goods tend to be produced in countries that we do not necessarily like. A consistency check is always a good lens to look at whatever it is that you are trying to decide.
Post scriptum: I have been quite vocal on my Twitter and LinkedIn accounts, and I got a lot of flak for it. At one point, I even got censured on LinkedIn, and I was very surprised about that because my pro-peace comments were everything but inflammatory. I looked at the identities and origin of the angry reactions and I note that a lot of them come from nationals from EU countries that have traditionally different views on Russia and, I must assume, other geopolitical questions too (think of China here) only because of their recent history.
Again, I am surprised that reasonable people act so emotionally on what should be analyzed rather coldly. When talking economic sanctions, cold economic and political analysis should be used to evaluate and decide whether to continue or, in the opposite case, roll them back. That is the point of view that I am defending in this post and on social media. In any case, to get away from personal attacks and emotional one-to-one tits-for-that, I should present something objective on public opinion on these questions. So I quickly googled and found this survey: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/16/europeans-divided-over-how-ukraine-war-should-play-out-reveals-poll. It is a bit dated (June) but it shows how divided public opinion in the EU actually is on the question. It also shows – I am happy about that in light of all the flak I have been getting for being pro-peace – that my views are actually not a minority view. On the contrary, in many of the older EU countries (except the UK, perhaps, but they walked out of the EU so we should not take them into account), people are clearly more rational about this and do consider our current stance to be way out of whack. When the EU Commission and our government leaders start ignoring majority opinion, and when vocal minorities shut down debate on peace and war questions, we are in very deep trouble as a democracy. Not only US democracy but Europe’s democracy as well has become a bit of an international joke.
To end on a happy note, I am a fan of American culture (do not be surprised: I like culture in general). Especially music (I like action hero movies too but the apocalyptic element in many of these looks frightening real now). Two songs that come to my mind right now is Coolio’s Gangsta’s Paradise and Where Is The Love from the Black Eyed Peas. A quote from the latter song: “The truth is kept secret, it’s swept under the rug; If you never know truth then you never know love.” And just one line from the first: “Tell me why are we so blind to see that the ones we hurt, are you and me?” I am now going to focus on life and fun again. Politics – both national as well as international – are too depressing to follow lately. 🙂
Geographically, Europe and Asia are part of the same continent: Eurasia. Of course, geopolitically, we speak of two continents: Europe and Asia. Or, thinking of Russian or Slavic or Turkish culture, and also of the Indian subcontinent and other large geopolitical realities, perhaps we should think of four or five subcontinents, right?
If you are reading blogs like this, then you must know a thing or two about influencers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski. He was a Polish diplomat before WW II: he was in Canada when Germany and Russia invaded Poland in 1939, and went on to study in the US. He was a counselor to US President Johnson (1966-1968), and went on to become President Carter’s National Security Advisor (1977-1981). He was in favor of ‘peaceful engagement’ with the Soviet Union (and China) at the height of the Cold War but he wrote this in his 1997 book, titled The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives:
“… how America “manages” Eurasia is critical. A power that dominates “Eurasia” would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over “Eurasia” would almost automatically entail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent. About 75 per cent of the world’s people live in “Eurasia”, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. “Eurasia” accounts for about three-fourths of the world’s known energy resources.”
His thesis was, basically, that no Eurasian challenger should emerge that can dominate Eurasia and challenge what he (and other US advisors and strategists) referred to as ‘US global preeminence’. I do not believe the US has achieved ‘global preeminence’: not before the writing of this book and also not since it was written, i.e. in this unexpectedly troublesome and volatile 21st century.
However, the US did achieve to transform what should have been a limited war between Europe and Russia into a global conflict, pitting the US, Europe and NATO on one side against what remains of the old Communist enemy: Russia. Russia is still the largest country (I am talking its landmass now, not its people or economy) on the Eurasian continent and in the world: 17 million km2. To make you appreciate this fact, think of this: the distance from Saint Petersburg (a city, by the way, that is larger than Berlin or Madrid) to Vladivostok is about 10,000 km. That is almost twice the distance between Norway’s North Cape and Gibraltar. Another fact that helps to appreciate this immensity is this: Russia, despite the loss of its satellites after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, is still about 70% larger than the second-, third-, and fourth-largest countries in the world: Canada, China and, yes, the US. [Despite its huge population, India is relatively small: its 3.2 million km2 amounts to about half of the territory of, say, Brazil or Australia.]
The strange visit of Ms. Pelosi, the US Democrat Party’s second-most senior leader after President Biden, to Taiwan has also heralded the start of a new Cold War with China. As a result, we may say that Eurasia, for all practical purposes, now consists of three geopolitical entities (and their respective spheres of influence) which should work together rather than blindly follow America’s ‘divide and rule’ tactics: Europe, China and Russia. Europe is not taking much of a lead in this (and Mr. Putin obviously cannot do anything at all) but China’s Xi Jinping seems to be serious about it. His talk about a new Era and rejuvenation – not only of China but for all countries who believe in multipolarity, multiculturalism, and peaceful coexistence – does not sound empty to me. We Europeans would be foolish to dismiss it out of hand as propaganda, and even if you think of it as propaganda: it is propaganda that, unlike former Soviet propaganda, is now changing the world, so we had better accept it as a reality. Terminology does not matter: facts speak louder than words nowadays.
What I write above may sound strange to those who know me, and understand for what I stand or stood: the end of ideology indeed, based on mutual respect and liberal or basic social-economic freedoms (it is futile and counterproductive to try to impose our concepts of Westminster-style democracy on the rest of the world), but I do believe it is the only way forward:
1. Europe must end the hot war with Russia, together with the UN and countries such as Turkey and, yes, China. The US is not interested in ending this war because its Army has a new outpost now in Ukraine, right in the heart of Eurasia. It is a far more convenient (and far more strategic) location than Afghanistan.
2. Europe must also not enter the new Cold War between the US and China. That is not in our interests. On the contrary, the time and prospects for cooperative long-term engagement with China have never been better. We must not keep Chinese companies like Huawei out of European tech markets. We should invest more in scientific and technological cooperation with China. We should talk more about our common interests at all levels – business and official – as US-China talks on issues like climate change, disarmament and other global challenges have broken down completely.
What I write above is not ideological. It is plain common sense. When everything is said and done, we need to prepare for the future of our children and our planet. If the US is not interested in doing that, then we Europeans should cut the umbilical cord with the US and move on with others. China’s Xi Jinping shows leadership (he is likely to be elected for a third term as President later this year) and its government officials say all of the right things. Why would we not believe them? There is no historical reason whatsoever to not trust China.
Post scriptum: I was born in an age where one could still bike across the southern and central parts of the Eurasian continent as a worry-free cyclist. Countries such as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and others were not democracies but they were all peaceful and fun to travel in. The much revered Lonely Planet guidebooks have their origin in such travels. It is sad these countries are all off-limits now. Most of Europe’s Sunni and Shia belt is now not very accessible or open. Why? Read their history: their instability often starts with the kind of stuff that we see happening in Ukraine now. If US interventions are well-intentioned (which you may still think to be the case), it is worth remembering an old wisdom: The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
I understand why Cold War thinkers such as Brzezinski (his name is Polish-Jewish, by the way) thought of ideologies such as Nazism, fascism or communism as ideologies that were evil and had to be destroyed: these ideologies effectively destroyed his home and family. However, when the Berlin Wall came down, such thinking no longer had its use, and it has become destructive in its own weird way: what is the difference between cultural or geopolitical hegemonic thought and fascism? I have used the term ‘moral fascism’ before, and it was censored on LinkedIn.
I am not taking it back: the lense that is used by pro-NATO thinkers and politicians in Europe amounts to moral fascism: we think of ourselves as inherently better than Russians or Chinese or whatever other people from countries whose systems we do not like or do not resemble ours. That is sure to lead to confrontation. The difference, this time around, is that we can no longer be sure to win whatever confrontation or conflict we wanted to start or join. In fact, I think we are very likely to enter a very different era, indeed! I am saying this based on my study of Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu starts his treatise on the Art of War by reminding the reader of the first principle of war: the Moral Law needs to be on your side. The US – and the EU, as it applauds America’s belligerent attitude vis-à-vis Russia and China now – can no longer claim to have the Moral Law on their side. That will backfire hugely. Most western observers laugh Xi Jinping’s talk about a new era away. I do not. There is toughness in most of the recent statements of Chinese leaders nowadays: I do not blame them.
I have quoted much eastern wisdom in this and other posts. Let me – just to show I also do know my own cultural roots, which are Christian – adapt a saying from the Bible, from the same era in which historians place Sun Tzu (and that is an era long before a Jesus or a Mohammed or other prophets created the religions many of us now believe in – religions which, unfortunately, ended up dividing those who are often referred to as the People of the Book): “For we sow the wind, and we shall reap the whirlwind. If the standing grain has no heads, it shall yield no flour. If it were to yield, strangers will devour it.” (Hosea 8:7)
What is commonly referred to as the East and the West (vague concepts, but they have their use) have more in common than what sets us apart. Europe and China share a common desire for peace and prosperity. We should build on that. Let us not be like “the blind leading the blind.” It is time for Europe to look East again. Beyond the Ural mountains which are said to form a natural border between Europe and Asia. There is no natural border between Europe and Asia. The ocean that divides us from America would qualify as such natural border. Rivers and mountains are there to be crossed and climbed. That is what inspired the conquests of Alexander The Great, most of which were done through marriage (marrying himself or marrying off his generals to create satrapies), by the way. Europeans may also be warriors at heart (all men probably are, biologically speaking, right?) but, if we are, I think of us as smart warriors – smarter than the US, in any case (but that is not very difficult if you look at the mess since WW II, I guess). 🙂
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